Problems in American Foreign Relations & Origins of the Cold War Paper Please choose a document from the Major Problems readings for the week you are writi

Problems in American Foreign Relations & Origins of the Cold War Paper Please choose a document from the Major Problems readings for the week you are writing. In a 1-2 page paper please respond to your chosen document. Your paper should include a bibliographical reference, and should have 2 parts to it.The first part of your paper should be a candid response to the document.Did you enjoy this document, did you find it overly long, or difficult to understand?Why did you choose this document to respond to?Did something about it stick out as familiar or surprising?Was there something you found interesting or intriguing?The second part of the paper should focus on why the document was created in the way it was.What type of document is it (an article, a speech, a letter, etc)?Who was intended to read it? What did the author want to accomplish or say through the work, and just as importantly- were they successful in their aims? Why or why not? What choices did they make that allowed the work to achieve that aim (or not)?Does your analysis of the document relate to your earlier reaction to the document (is it suitable that you didn’t find a supreme court case to be very exciting, or that a political speech was written in clear accessible language)?Remember to be specific and use examples from the text (with citations) to describe your ideas. Major Problems in American Foreign Re
292
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8. The National Security Council Paper
No. 68 (NSC-68) Reassesses the Soviet Threat
and Recommends a Military Buildup, 1950
One
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for 4
indi
rior
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mendous violence. It has witnessed two revolutions—the Russian and the Chinese-
Within the past thirty-five years the world has experienced two global wars of tre-
of extreme scope and intensity. It has also seen the collapse of five empires—the
Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, German, Italian, and Japanese—and the drastic
decline of two major imperial systems, the British and the French. During the
of one generation, the international distribution of power has been fundamentally
altered. For several centuries it had proved impossible for any one nation to gain
such preponderant strength that a coalition of other nations could not in time face it
span
tain
Ad
“CO
trac
also
mo
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for
po
op
with greater strength. The international scene was marked by recurring periods of
violence and war, but a system of sovereign and independent states was main-
tained, over which no state was able to achieve hegemony.
Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this historical distri-
bution of power. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British
and French Empires have interacted with the development of the United States and
the Soviet Union in such a way that power has increasingly gravitated to these two
centers. Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is ani-
mated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute
authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is
waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accor-
dance with the dictates of expediency. With the development of increasingly terrify-
ing weapons of mass destruction, every individual faces the ever-present possibility
of annihilation should the conflict enter the phase of total war. …
Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to fos-
ter a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. It
participation in the world community.
therefore rejects the concept of isolation and affirms the necessity of our positive
“CO
de
fir
gr
se
SI
S
This broad intention embraces two subsidiary policies. One is a policy which
we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat. It is a policy of at-
tempting to develop a healthy international community. The other is the policy of
“containing the Soviet system. These two policies are closely interrelated and inter-
act on one another. Nevertheless, the distinction between them is basically valid and
contributes to a clearer understanding of what we are trying to do.
As for the policy of “containment,” it is one which seeks by all means short of
war to (1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet
pretentions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin’s control and influence and (4) in
general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin
accepted international standards.
is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally
This document can be found in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950,
1977), I, 237, 252-253, 262–263, 264, 282, 290.
National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
The Origins of the Cold War
293
1950
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It was and continues to be cardinal in this policy that we possess superior overall
power in ourselves or in dependable combination with other like-minded nations.
One of the most important ingredients of power is military strength. In the
concept
“containment,” the maintenance of a strong military posture is deemed to be essential
for two reasons: (1) as an ultimate guarantee of our national security and (2) as an
indispensable backdrop to the conduct of the policy of “containment.” Without supe-
rior aggregate military strength, in being and readily mobilizable, a policy of “con-
tainment”—which is in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion—is no
At the same time, it is essential to the successful conduct of a policy of “con-
tainment” that we always leave open the possibility of negotiation with the U.S.S.R.
A diplomatic freeze—and we are in one now—tends to defeat the very purposes of
“containment” because it raises tensions at the same time that it makes Soviet re-
tractions and adjustments in the direction of moderated behavior more difficult. It
also tends to inhibit our initiative and deprives us of opportunities for maintaining a
moral ascendancy in our struggle with the Soviet system.
In “containment” it is desirable to exert pressure in a fashion which will avoid
so far as possible directly challenging Soviet prestige, to keep open the possibility
for the U.S.S.R. to retreat before pressure with a minimum loss of face and to secure
political advantage from the failure of the Kremlin to yield or take advantage of the
openings we leave it.
We have failed to implement adequately these two fundamental aspects of
“containment.” In the face of obviously mounting Soviet military strength ours has
declined relatively. Partly as a byproduct of this, but also for other reasons, we now
find ourselves at a diplomatic impasse with the Soviet Union, with the Kremlin
growing bolder, with both of us holding on grimly to what we have and with our-
selves facing difficult decisions.
It is apparent from the preceding sections that the integrity and vitality of our
system is in greater jeopardy than ever before in our history. Even if there were no
Soviet Union we would face the great problem of the free society, accentuated
many fold in this industrial age, of reconciling order, security, the need for partici-
pation, with the requirements of freedom.
It is quite clear from Soviet theory and practice that the Kremlin seeks to bring
the free world under its dominion by the methods of the cold war. The preferred
technique is to subvert by infiltration and intimidation. Every institution of our
society is an instrument which it is sought to stultify and turn against our purposes.
Those that touch most closely our material and moral strength are obviously the
prime targets, labor unions, civic enterprises, schools, churches, and all media for
influencing opinion. …
At the same time the Soviet Union is seeking to create overwhelming military
force, in order to back up infiltration with intimidation. In the only terms in which it
understands strength, it is seeking to demonstrate to the free world that force and the
will to use it are on the side of the Kremlin, that those who lack it are decadent and
doomed. In local incidents it threatens and encroaches both for the sake of local
gains and to increase anxiety and defeatism in all the free world.
The possession of atomic weapons at each of the opposite poles of power, and
the inability (for different reasons) of either side to place any trust in the other, puts a
tar.
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necessity of uri
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The other is the
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Major Problems in American Foreign Relati
294
us.
others, cinema preventive war.com
ciently objective to realize the improbability of our
ingness to engage in atomic war unless we are directly attacked.
and ruthless prosecution of its design by cold war, especially if the Kremlin is suffi-
also puts a premium on piecemeal aggression against others, counting on our unwill-
A more rapid build-up of political, economic, and military strength and thereby
of confidence in the free world than is now contemplated is the only course which is
consistent with progress toward achieving our fundamental purpose. The frustration
of the Kremlin design requires the free world to develop a successfully functioning
political and economic system and a vigorous political offensive against the Soviet
Union. These, in turn, require an adequate military shield under which they can
develop. It is necessary to have the military power to deter, if possible, Soviet
expansion, and to defeat, if necessary, aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed actions
of a limited or total character. The potential strength of the free world is great; its
ability to develop these military capabilities and its will to resist Soviet expansion
• • •
will be determined by the wisdom and will with which it undertakes to meet its
political and economic problems.
Our position as the center of power in the free world places a heavy responsi-
bility upon the United States for leadership. We must organize and enlist the energies
and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace which will frustrate
the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to
which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust. Without such a cooperative effort, led
by the United States, we will have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until
we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest.
It is imperative that this trend be reversed by a much more rapid and concerted
build-up of the actual strength of both the United States and the other nations of the
free world. The analysis shows that this will be costly and will involve significant
domestic financial and economic adjustments.
ESSAYS
the detrimental effects of the bomb and atomic diplomacy
In the opening essay, Barton J. Bernstein, a professor of history at Stanford University,
analyzes the Roosevelt and Truman administrations’ thinking about the atomic bomb’s
the Soviet Union. Bernstein agrees with most historians that Truman ordered the use of
place both as a weapon to defeat Japan and as a lever to pry diplomatic concessions from
the atomic bomb against Japanese civilians primarily to end the war quickly and to save
American lives. But he also explores the bomb as a diplomatic “bonus” that American
leaders believed would enhance U.S. bargaining power in the Cold War, and he explains
on Soviet-American relations.
In the second essay, Arnold A. Offner of Lafayette College critically assesses President
ruthless dictatorship and the deep ideological differences between the Soviet Union and
Harry S. Truman’s role in the coming of the Cold War. Offner acknowledges that Stalin’s
the United States contributed to Cold War conflict. But he emphasizes how Truman’s
issues, exaggerate the Soviet threat, and rely on military preparedness to contain Soviet
own insecurity, parochialism, and nationalism led the president to oversimplify complex
expansionism. The administration’s atomic diplomacy, its insistence on making
Germany the cornerstone for Europe’s reconstruction, and deployment of U.S. naval
West
TOUGHTON MIFFLIN
Hajor Problems in American History
PATERSON
MERRILL
Major Problems in American
Foreign Relations
Concise Edition
Foreign Relations
Major Problems in American
a foron
DOCUMENTS AND ESSAYS EDITED BY
DENNIS MERRILL AND THOMAS G. PATERSON
CONCISE
EDITION
HOUGHTON
MIFFLIN

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